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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,' administered by the
United States International Trade Commission ("ITC" or "Com-
mission"), offers unique opportunities to protect American indus-
try from unfair competition in import trade. Widespread misun-
derstanding of the jurisdictional basis for the ITC's exercise of
authority under section 337 contributes to a failure to utilize fully
the remedial power of the statute. This article will review briefly
the historical development of section 337 and the remedies availa-
ble under it, discuss competing jurisdictional theories relating to
the remedial powers of section 337, and suggest that complainants
request the Commission to issue cease and desist orders resting on
personal jurisdiction and that they be enforced in federal district
court.
* The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the United States International Trade Commission or other
members of the Office of Administrative Law Judges.
t Chief Administrative Law Judge, United States International Trade
Commission.
tt Attorney-Advisor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, United States In-
ternational Trade Commission.
1. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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II. HISTORY OF SECTION 337
The basic thrust of section 337 has remained unchanged since
its passage as part of the Tariff Act of 1930.2 Amendments in 19753
and 1979" had a substantive impact on the jurisdictional and reme-
dial aspects of the statute which are the subject of this article.
Section 337(a) 5 declares unfair methods of competition
unlawful:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the impor-
tation of articles into the United States, or in their sale by the
owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or ten-
dency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry,
efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, or to
prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or
monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are hereby
declared unlawful, and when found by the President to exist shall
be dealt with, in addition to any other provisions of law, as here-
inafter provided.'
Section 337(a) has remained unchanged from its inception ex-
cept for the above italicized portions. The Trade Act of 1974 al-
tered the respective roles of the ITC (formerly named the Tariff
2. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. III, § 337, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (codified in
current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202 to 1677g (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
3. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341(a), 88 Stat. 2053, 2379 (1975)
(current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982)).
4. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1105(b), 93 Stat. 311
(1979) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982)).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a). The reader is cautioned not to confuse § 1337(a) and §
1337a. Congress enacted section 1337a in 1940 (54 Stat. 724) as an amendment to
title 19 of the United States Code, without amending the Tariff Act of 1930. Sec-
tion 1337a relates to process patents:
The importation for use, sale, or exchange of a product made, produced,
processed, or mined under or by means of a process covered by the
claims of any unexpired valid United States letters patent, shall have the
same status for the purposes of section 1337 of this title as the importa-
tion of any product or article covered by the claims of any unexpired
valid United States letters patent.
Only the ITC currently has jurisdiction to provide a remedy against a product
manufactured abroad by a process that would infringe a United States process
patent if practiced in the United States. Legislation has been proposed that would
give the district courts jurisdiction over this situation as well. See S. 1543, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 1069, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
6. 46 Stat. 703 (1930). The italicized portions have subsequently been
amended: "President" was changed to "Commission" and the last clause was
changed to "as provided in this section." See Trade Act of 1974, supra note 3.
[Vol. 9:45
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Commission) and the President. Before 1975, the President made
the finding of an unfair act with the assistance of the Commission;
the 1974 Act gave the ITC the authority to determine whether an
unfair act exists and the authority to impose a remedy, subject to
judicial review7 as well as providing the opportunity for the Presi-
dent to disapprove the determination for policy reasons.s
Before 1975, the only remedy available for a violation of sec-
tion 337(a) was the exclusion of articles from entry into the United
States.9 The 1974 Act added a second remedy: the Commission was
authorized to issue, in lieu of an exclusion order, an order to cease
and desist from engaging in the unfair methods or acts involved.10
In commenting on this change, the Senate Finance Committee
stated that the exclusion order remedy was "extreme and inappro-
priate in some cases," and that "the power to issue cease and de-
sist orders would add needed flexibility" to the Commission's re-
medial authority." The Commission could modify or revoke an
order to cease and desist, and if revoked, issue an exclusion order
in its place,'2 but there was no provision for a penalty in case the
order was violated.' 3
7. Trade Act of 1974, § 337(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982). The reviewing
court is the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
8. Trade Act of 1974, § 337(g)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982).
9. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. III, § 337(e), 46 Stat. 703, 704 (1930) (cur-
rent version at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982)).
10. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341(a), 88 Stat. 2053, (1975)
(amending § 337(f), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (1982)). The "in lieu of" qualifier origi-
nally was interpreted by the Commission to mean that an exclusion order and
orders to cease and desist were mutually exclusive in any given investigation. See
Doxycycline, Inv. No. 337-TA-3, USITC Pub. 964, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 963
(1979). Later, both remedies were used in the same investigation, but applied to
separate unfair acts. See, Certain Airtight Cast-iron Stoves, Inv. No. 337-TA-69,
USITC Pub. No. 1126 (1981). More recently, both remedies have been applied to
the same unfair act. Certain Compound Action Metal Cutting Snips and Compo-
nents Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-197, USITC Pub. No. 1831 (1986). The General
Accounting Office has proposed that Congress clearly authorize the Commission
to issue both exclusion orders and cease and desist orders to remedy the same
unfair trade practice. GAO Report to Selected Cong. Subcomm., International
Trade: Strengthening Trade Law Protection of Intellectual Property Rights,
GAO/NSIAD-86-150 (August 1986).
11. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 198 (1974).
12. Trade Act of 1974, § 337(f), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f). This provision is still in
effect.
13. A cease and desist order prohibiting a respondent from importing a spe-
cific product was a hollow threat. An exclusion order imposed to replace a disre-
garded cease and desist order would call on the Customs Service to enforce the
1986]
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The 1979 Act' 4 added a powerful tool for the enforcement of
section 337, a tool that frequently is overlooked and never has
been used: a new subsection (f)(2)' 5 was added, giving the Commis-
sion the power to bring a civil penalty action in federal district
court against any person who violates a cease and desist order of
the Commission. The penalty accrues to the United States and the
amount of the penalty is, "for each day on which an importation of
articles, or their sale, occurs in violation of the order. . . not more
than the greater of $10,000 or the domestic value of the articles
entered or sold on such day in violation of the order."16 In addi-
tion, the 1979 Act gave the district court authority to issue
"mandatory injunctions incorporating the relief sought by the
Commission as they deem appropriate in the enforcement of such
final orders of the Commission."' 7 The Senate Finance Committee
described these changes as providing "a more flexible remedy"
since the only previous remedy for violation of a cease and desist
order, imposition of an exclusion order, was sometimes "too draco-
nian." '8 At the same time, the amount of the penalty was designedto be a deterrent to the violation of the order.' 9
III. JURISDICTIONAL BASIS OF SECTION 337
To start a section 337 case, the Commission must have subject
matter jurisdiction or the authority to hear the case. This can be
found if the complainant has alleged an unfair act as defined in
section 337, i.e., an unfair act in connection with the importation
of products into or their subsequent sale in the United States.
Once the Commission finds subject matter jurisdiction three addi-
tional jurisdictional issues remain. These involve the Commission's
power to take certain steps that may alter the rights of people,
exclusion, rather than relying on voluntary compliance. A respondent who was
inclined to profit by disobeying the cease and desist order could do so during the
period of time necessary for the Commission to find out that the cease and desist
order was being violated and to issue the exclusion order, which it could have
issued in the first place.
14. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1105(b), 93 Stat. 311
(1979) (current version at 19 U.S.C. 1337 (1982)).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2) (1982).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 262 (1979).
19. Id.
[Vol. 9:45
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property, or evidence in the section 337 case and therefore its ulti-
mate outcome.
A. Jurisdiction To Issue Exclusion Orders.
It is settled law that in personam jurisdiction is not required
to support the issuance of an exclusion order, since "[a]n exclusion
order operates against goods, not parties." 0 Perhaps because it is
clear that the exclusion order remedy is not in personam, commen-
tators and attorneys have referred to the "in rem jurisdiction" of
the ITC when discussing the exclusion order remedy.2" While there
are similarities between the traditional notion of in rem jurisdic-
tion and a section 337 case, there are important distinctions that
make the use of the term "in rem" inappropriate in section 337
cases.
22
In rem jurisdiction usually is exercised by seizing or attaching
the property. ' s At a minimum, the property must be found in the
jurisdiction of the court." In Shaffer v. Heitner,25 the Supreme
Court stated:
If a court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over the de-
fendant's person, the action and judgment are denominated "in
personam" and can impose a personal obligation on the defend-
ant in favor of the plaintiff. If jurisdiction is based on the court's
power over property within its territory, the action is called "in
rem" or "quasi in rem. '
20. Sealed Air Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 985
(C.C.P.A. 1981).
21. See Perry, The In Rem Jurisdiction of Section 337 Unfair Trade Inves-
tigations, 2 WEST'S INT'L L. BULL. 4040-41 (1984); Leonard and Taylor, Section
337: a Familiar Road into Strange Country, 12 AIPLA Q.J. 336 (1984); Note,
Protection of Computers and Computer Software Before the United States In-
ternational Trade Commission, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 627, 637 (1985).
22. Although the Sealed Air case (645 F.2d 976) has been cited as the source
of the theory of in rem jurisdiction under section 337, it is interesting to note that
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its predecessors have never used
the term "in rem" in a case involving the ITC, according to the results of a search
of the Westlaw database.
23. Thormann v. Frame, 176 U.S. 350 (1900); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877); The Rio Grande, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 458 (1874).
24. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); L.B. Harvey Marine, Inc. v. MN
"River Arc", 712 F.2d 458 (11th Cir. 1983); 4 C. WRIGHT & K. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1070 at 270 (1969).
25. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
26. Id. at 199.
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5
Saxon and Newhouse: ection 337 Jurisdiction and the Forgotten Remedy
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
When in rem jurisdiction is asserted, the court can issue an
order only affecting property which is under the control of the
court; if the res is no longer before the court, in rem jurisdiction
and the ability to enforce a judgment against property are lost.2 7
At the ITC, in contrast, no attempt is made to seize or attach
property or otherwise to bring it before the forum. If the Commis-
sion issues an exclusion order, the Commission does not seize the
property and dispose of it. The order is directed to the Customs
Service. Usually, the exclusion order requests the Customs Service
to exclude the product from the United States unless the product
is licensed. The Commission's exclusion order places limits on the
disposition of the property, but does not dispose of the property as
in an in rem case.
In Appendix B of the ITC's decision in Certain Steel Rod
Treating Apparatus,28 the Commission stated that in rem jurisdic-
tion can be found in section 337 cases because the "res" or prop-
erty is either in the United States or "constructively present" by
virtue of its sale and imminent importation. This "constructive
presence" theory appears to be a strained attempt to fit the Com-
mission's power into the in rem mold. If the property already has
been imported into the United States, the ITC surely can take ju-
risdiction over it, but the Commission has never issued an in rem
order against property located in the United States. Instead, an
order to cease and desist sometimes is issued against the owner of
the property in the United States.2 If the property is located
outside the United States, the ITC does not attempt to control it
beyond ordering Customs to try to exclude it from the country. An
owner of property about to be imported into the United States can
still "turn the ship around" at the last minute and take his prop-
erty home, or to anyplace else in the world. Even if the property is
stopped by the Customs Service, the owner can take it back home
or to another port of entry into the United States for section 337
has no provision for ordering seizure of goods. 30 Thus, no real con-
trol over property outside the United States is derived from the
27. L.B. Harvey Marine, 712 F.2d 458; 4 WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1070 at 267 (1969).
28. Inv. No. 337-TA-97, USITC Pub. No. 1210, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 234
(1981).
29. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
30. The General Accounting Office has suggested a change in legislation to
permit the Commission to order Customs to seize the property in certain in-
stances. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 9:45
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legal fiction of "constructive presence" and the constructive pres-
ence theory provides no real basis for asserting in rem jurisdiction.
Since there is a nonfictional way to explain the basis of the Com-
mission's order power, as will be shown below, the constructive
presence theory should be abandoned.
The source of the Commission's power to exclude products
from importation is a Congressional delegation of authority. Under
the Constitutional power to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions which is expressly conferred upon Congress,3 ' Congress has
plenary power to exclude merchandise brought from foreign coun-
tries.32 It can exert a police power over foreign commerce by provi-
sions amounting to the assertion of the right to exclude merchan-
dise "at discretion." No individual has a vested right to trade with
foreign nations, and a statute which excludes goods from the
United States does not violate the due process clause of the Con-
stitution.3 3 The importer does not have a constitutional right to a
hearing before his property is excluded.
34
In contrast, in rem jurisdiction, based on control over property
before the court, carries with it constitutional rights to due pro-
cess, including notice to the property owner and the right to de-
fend the action in a forum having minimum contacts with the liti-
gation and the property owner. 35 At the ITC, there is a statutory
right to notice and the opportunity for a hearing before products
can be excluded from importation.3 6
B. Jurisdiction To Issue Cease and Desist Orders
As discussed above, the Trade Act of 1974 granted authority
to the ITC to issue cease and desist orders.3 7 In Certain Welded
Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube,38 a case that was decided after the
grant of authority to issue orders to cease and desist and before
civil penalties were authorized for their violation, the Commission
considered and rejected the contention that personal jurisdiction
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
32. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492 (1904).
33. Id. at 493.
34. Id. at 492-93, 497.
35. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
36. Section 337(c) requires the Commission to give "notice and the opportu-
nity for a hearing in conformity with the provisions of sub-chapter II of chapter 5
of Title 5" [i.e., the Administrative Procedure Act]. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c).
37. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
38. Inv. No. 337-TA-29, USITC Pub. No. 863 (1978).
19861
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over a party was required before a cease and desist order could be
issued. The Commission pointed out that "[tihe cease and desist
order itself merely compels parties to refrain from unfair trade
practices or risk exclusion of their products. This Commission has
no independent power beyond that of exclusion."39 The Commis-
sion relied on Buttfield v. Stranahan40 for the proposition that the
exercise of the exclusion power without personal jurisdiction was
not contrary to the due process clause.' 1 Although the possibility of
court enforcement of a cease and desist order under 19 U.S.C. §
1333(c) was raised, and the need to obtain personal jurisdiction in
that event was foreseen, the Commission discounted the likelihood
that such a course of action would be contemplated or effective:
"In most cases, exclusion is our only practical means of
enforcement. 42
In Certain Large Video Matrix Display Systems and Compo-
nents Thereof,43 the Commission for the first time treated the is-
sue of jurisdiction in conjunction with the authority to seek civil
penalty fines granted by the 1979 act." There, the Commission
correctly found two requirements before a cease and desist order
could be issued: "(1) a finding of jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter . . . and (2) a finding of in personam jurisdiction over the per-
sons whose acts are sought to be enjoined.' 45
No case has been found that answers the specific question of
whether a federal agency must have in personam jurisdiction in
order to issue a valid cease and desist order which could lead to
the imposition of civil penalties. There has been no occasion for
the federal courts to rule on this question in the context of an ITC
cease and desist order, since the ITC has not yet brought any en-
forcement or civil penalty actions in district court.
Cases involving other agencies clearly establish that elements
of due process must be satisfied before a penalty may be imposed
39. Id. at 5.
40. 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
41. Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29,
USITC Pub. No. 863 at 6.
42. Id.
43. Inv. No. 337-TA-75, USITC Pub. No. 1158, at 30, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
475 (1981).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1377(f)(2) (1982).
45. Certain Large Video Matrix Display Systems, Inv. No. 337-TA-75,
USITC Pub. No. 1158, at 30, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 488.
(Vol. 9:45
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on a person. In Mathews v. Aldridge, 6 a case involving the termi-
nation of Social Security benefits, the Supreme Court stated that
[pirocedural due process imposes constraints on governmental de-
cisions which deprive individuals of "liberty" or "property" inter-
ests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment. ...
This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is
required before an individual is finally deprived of a property in-
terest. . . .The "right to be heard before being condemned to
suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve
the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle
basic to our society." . . . The fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner. '4,7
A party must be informed of the basis of the complaint against it
and have a full opportunity to meet the charges.48 Due process re-
quires that an administrative hearing constitute a fair trial, con-
ducted in accordance with fundamental principles of fair play and
applicable procedural standards established by law."9 It is submit-
ted that due process also requires that the ITC establish in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a party before issuing an order that could
result in the imposition of a penalty if the order is disobeyed.
C. Jurisdiction to Issue Discovery Orders
Relying on the Commission's frequent description of its "in
rem" jurisdiction, many attorneys seek orders compelling discovery
from a foreign party who has not appeared or participated in any
way in the case, without making any attempt to establish that the
Commission has jurisdiction over the party. Personal jurisdiction is
not required to support a discovery order against a party if the end
result of failure to comply with the order is the imposition of an
exclusion order based on evidentiary sanctions, because personal
jurisdiction is not required to support an exclusion order." If the
46. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
47. Id. at 332-33 (citations omitted).
48. Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 785 F.2d 1431
(9th Cir. 1986); Citizens State Bank of Marshfield, Mo. v. Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corp., 751 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1984).
49. Precious Metals Associates, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
620 F.2d 900 (1st Cir. 1980).
50. Sealed Air Corp. v. USITC, 645 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
1986]
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end result is to be the issuance of an order to cease and desist,
personal jurisdiction should be required before issuance of the evi-
dentiary orders that could lead to issuance of the final order.
When it is possible, it is the better practice for the complain-
ant to establish the existence of personal jurisdiction over the re-
spondent before asking the Administrative Law Judge to issue dis-
covery orders against a respondent. It is relatively easy to establish
personal jurisdiction,"' and there is little excuse for failing to do so.
Many complainants, perhaps lulled by frequent references to
the ITC's "in rem" jurisdiction, focus on the exclusion order as the
ultimate remedy and do not seek a cease and desist order against
any respondent. Nevertheless, only the Commission-not the com-
plainant or the Administrative Law Judge-can determine the
remedy, and if the Commission determines that a cease and desist
order is appropriate, the necessary foundation for in personam ju-
risdiction ought to have been laid. Only if the Commission abjured
the possibility of issuing a cease and desist order from the outset of
a case-a most unlikely event-could a decision not to establish
personal jurisdiction be supported.
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO ESTABLISHING
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
"The existence of personal jurisdiction . ..depends upon the
presence of reasonable notice to the defendant that an action has
been brought. . . and a sufficient connection between the defend-
ant and the forum State to make it fair to require defense of the
action in the forum."52
What activities of a foreign respondent in a section 337 inves-
tigation are sufficient to subject it to the in personam jurisdiction
of the ITC or of a district court, in a subsequent action by the ITC
to enforce a personal order against the respondent? The case law
does not answer this question. The ITC has yet to seek to enforce a
personal order against a foreign respondent.
The boundaries of the ITC's in personam jurisdiction ought to
be evaluated in light of the "minimum contacts" standard devel-
oped in International Shoe Co. v. Washington"3 and cases follow-
51. See infra Part IV.
52. Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) (citing Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) and Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457 (1940)).
53. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
[Vol. 9:45
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ing it.,4 Although these cases have addressed principally the due
process limitations on state courts seeking to exert jurisdiction
over nonresidents of the state, the theory of minimum contacts can
be used to evaluate the propriety of an attempt by the ITC to ex-
ert in personam jurisdiction over respondents located outside the
United States.5 Under International Shoe, a binding personal
judgment against a person requires that the person "have certain
minimum contacts with [the forum State] such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' "6 The minimum contacts test requires a
determination in each case that it is "reasonable" and "fair" to
require a party to conduct his defense in the forum. 7 A standard
of "reasonableness" cannot be applied mechanically, but depends
on the facts of each case.58 The Supreme Court has found it rea-
sonable to subject a nonresident corporation to a state's in per-
sonam jurisdiction if the corporation "purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, '"59 or
if it "delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State. '60 A defendant whose product comes into the forum state as
a result of his deliberate, although perhaps indirect, effort is sub-
ject to the state's personal jurisdiction. 1 The execution of even a
single contract in the forum has been held sufficient to satisfy the
"minimum contacts" test and subject the party to personal
jurisdiction.62
Most jurisdictional issues arising in the context of a section
337 investigation can be resolved readily in light of these princi-
54. See cases cited infra notes 59-62.
55. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694 (1982) (applying minimum contacts analysis to non-United States
residents in finding in personam jurisdiction).
56. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
57. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316, 319.
58. Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. at 92.
59. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
60. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1979) (dic-
tum) (citing with approval Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961)).
61. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (10th
Cir. 1985).
62. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), Stanley v. Local 926 of
the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 354 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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pies. Typically, foreign respondents6" fall into one of a limited
number of categories: a manufacturer who sells an accused product
directly to United States purchasers; a manufacturer who sells to a
third party (e.g., a trading company), also outside the United
States, who then resells to a U.S. customer; and the trading com-
pany that sells to a U.S. customer. Direct sales to a United States
purchaser almost always subject the seller to in personam jurisdic-
tion in the United States. 4 Indirect sales through a sales agent or
trading company should result in a finding of in personam jurisdic-
tion over the manufacturer when it could be shown that the manu-
facturer had knowledge that his goods would be sold to U.S. con-
sumers, or if he acquired knowledge that his goods were being sold
to U.S. consumers and continued to sell to the intermediate party.
In this situation, the manufacturer's products come into the
United States through his deliberate effort, resulting in personal
jurisdiction under the World-Wide Volkswagen principle.6 5
Not all respondents named in section 337 actions, however,
can be found subject to the ITC's in personam jurisdiction. A com-
plainant may name a respondent solely because the complainant
has seen, in a publication that may be directed to a worldwide au-
dience, an advertisement for an item thought to infringe an intel-
lectual property right. If that was the only contact with the United
States, a finding of personal jurisdiction over this respondent
would be unlikely.66
What if a foreign respondent fails to participate in the investi-
gation, as is frequently the case? Can the complainant establish
facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of in personam juris-
diction in the absence of discovery responses by the respondent, or
can the respondent "simply refuse to participate and thereby
render section 337 a nullity"?67 Facing a similar problem, the Su-
preme Court gave an important weapon to the plaintiff in Insur-
ance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
63. Domestic respondents, being located within the territorial jurisdiction of
the federal government, are of course per se subject to the in personam jurisdic-
tion of the ITC.
64. Conceivably, a sale might be so isolated and de minimis that it would be
unfair to require the seller to appear and defend in this forum.
65. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1979).
66. A motion to terminate the investigation as to him on the basis that he
had committed no unfair act likely would be granted as well.
67. Certain Composite Diamond Coated Textile Machinery Components, Inv.
No. 337-TA-160 (Commission Memorandum Opinion filed February 6, 1984) 11.
[Vol. 9:45 1
12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol9/iss1/3
SECTION 337 JURISDICTION
Guinee." In the Bauxites case, the Court held that a finding of
personal jurisdiction could be based on a sanction for failure to
comply with discovery orders, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). The Court pointed out that "the manner in
which the court determines whether it has personal jurisdiction
may include a variety of legal rules and presumptions, as well as
straightforward factfinding." 9 Absent an abuse of discretion, ap-
plication of the sanction results in a legal presumption of personal
jurisdiction.70 The ITC has a similar, although not identical, sanc-
tions rule7 1 that has been used to establish personal jurisdiction.
A three-step procedure must be used to establish personal ju-
risdiction by the sanctions method. First, one should serve limited
interrogatories on the respondent, including one or two simple
questions addressed to the jurisdictional issue. For example, "In
the past two years, have you made more than two shipments of
widgets to the United States?" This is followed by a motion to
compel answers to these interrogatories, pursuant to ITC rule
210.36(a).7 2 "Reasonable notice" of the motion also must be given
to the respondent.73 Reasonable notice should be demonstrated by
personal service of this motion on respondent, or a signed return
receipt for certified or registered mail. Finally, after respondent's
time to comply with the order has expired, a motion for sanctions
should be filed based on the respondent's failure to comply with
the order compelling discovery. 4
Very few interrogatories are required to establish the mini-
mum contacts needed to support a finding of personal jurisdiction.
In the recent case of Certain Indomethacin,7 5 a foreign respondent
was ordered to answer the following questions:
(1) Has Respondent exported (shipped) indomethacin or in-
domethacin products to the United States?
(2) If the response to the preceding Interrogatory is anything
68. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 19 C.F.R. § 210.36(b)(1) (1985).
72. 19 C.F.R. § 210.36(a) (1985). The rule reads as follows: "A party may
apply to the administrative law judge for an order compelling discovery, upon
reasonable notice to the other party and all persons affected thereby."
73. Id.
74. Of course, if the order is complied with, complainant will need to evalu-
ate the answers and proceed appropriately with the fact finding process.
75. Inv. No. 337-TA-183 (1986).
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other than an unqualified negative, identify for each shipment:
a. the date of the shipment and
b. the quantity of indomethacin shipped.76
Complainant's subsequent motion for sanctions upon respondent's
failure to comply with the order was granted and it was found that
respondent "has exported indomethacin or indomethacin products
to the United States, on more than one occasion since December
27, 1983, in substantial quantities." 7 After these findings were
made, personal jurisdiction was found on the basis of the sanctions
rule.78 Given the relative ease with which this finding can be made,
complainants should seek a finding of in personam jurisdiction
early in the course of every section 337 investigation.
An alternative method to establish personal jurisdiction over a
defaulting respondent, if the complainant can attest to sufficient
facts in an affidavit, would be the filing of a motion for summary
determination under ITC rule 210.50.79 If the respondent has ade-
quate notice of the motion and fails to respond to it, a finding of
personal jurisdiction would be consistent with the principles estab-
lished in Bauxites.8 0
V. EXCLUSION ORDER OR CEASE AND DESIST ORDER?
Once a complainant has established the in personam jurisdic-
tion necessary to permit the issuance of orders to cease and desist,
should he seek this remedy for a violation of section 337, or re-
quest the ITC to issue a general exclusion order to be enforced by
the Customs Service? Until passage of the Trade Act of 1974,81 the
exclusion order was the only remedy for violation of section 337.
The general exclusion order remains the favored remedy of many
complainants, perhaps because of its familiarity in addition to cer-
tain advantages it offers the party seeking relief against unfair im-
port competition. The general exclusion order may be the only ef-
fective relief when the product in issue is being made by numerous
foreign manufacturers, many of whom may be unidentified. This
remedy is also appropriate where manufacturing start-up costs are
small, since new infringers could easily replace those enjoined from
76. Id., Order No. 50, filed June 6, 1986.
77. Id., Order No. 51, filed July 10, 1986.
78. Id.
79. 19 C.F.R. § 210.50 (1985).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
81. See supra note 3.
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production or those enjoined could easily set up shop under a dif-
ferent name, in a different garage, thus escaping easy detection.
In Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and Components
Thereof,8 2 the ITC issued an exclusion order limited to the prod-
ucts of the only manufacturing respondent in the case. The Com-
mission, seeking to ameliorate "the inherent potential of a general
exclusion order to disrupt legitimate trade,"' s3 stated that a general
exclusion order would be issued only when the complainant proved
"both a widespread pattern of unauthorized use of its patented in-
vention and certain business conditions from which one might rea-
sonably infer that foreign manufacturers other than the respon-
dents to the investigation may attempt to enter the U.S. market
with infringing articles.""
The exclusion order remedy also has disadvantages from the
complainant's point of view. The General Accounting Office re-
cently surveyed firms that have obtained section 337 exclusion or-
ders and found less than total satisfaction with the relief ob-
tained.8" Of the firms responding to the survey that indicated they
had a basis to judge, sixty-five percent reported that counterfeit or
infringing goods continued to enter the country after entry of an
exclusion order. Of those sixty-five percent, twenty-nine percent
reported that the value of infringing goods changed little, while
seventy-one percent reported that the value of infringing goods de-
creased substantially.8 6 Of the firms indicating that infringing
goods continued to enter, forty-six percent indicated that their
sales were injured to a moderate or substantial extent, and twenty-
seven percent reported some damage to sales.87 The GAO report
points out that infringers may ignore the exclusion order, placing
the enforcement burden on Customs port inspectors.88 Although
many firms were very pleased with Customs' enforcement efforts,
others reported that enforcement was inadequate. 8' Since Customs
82. 46 Fed. Reg. 58,616 (Inv. No. 337-TA-90, USITC Pub. No. 1199, 216
U.S.P.Q. 465 (BNA) (1981)).
83. Id., 216 U.S.P.Q. at 473.
84. Id.
85. GAO Report to Selected Cong. Subcomm., International Trade: U.S.
Firms' Views on Customs' Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, GAO/
NSIAD-86-96 (May 1986).
86. Id. at 18-19.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 17.
89. Id. at 18, 20.
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can only exclude, not seize, infringing goods, and the foreign in-
fringer is entitled to re-export the goods, the deterrent effect of an
exclusion order is not great.9 Indeed, a determined infringer is free
to go from port to port hoping to find one where his goods will slip
through; apparently they frequently do. The report cites the Con-
gressional testimony of the General Counsel of Apple Computer,
Inc. "[ITC] exclusion orders, which provide for the re-export of the
illicit goods rather than for seizure or forfeiture, invite importers to
'port shop' for an entry point that is understaffed or ill-equipped
to detect and intercept infringing merchandise."'"
The GAO has proposed that section 337 be amended to au-
thorize the ITC to direct the Customs Service to seize counterfeit
or infringing goods "when there is evidence that a firm or firms
have on more than one occasion attempted to bring such goods
into the country in knowing violation of exclusion orders. ' 92 Such
seizure authority could increase the effectiveness of the exclusion
order remedy and would be a salutary change in the law.
Broader use of the existing cease and desist order remedy
might have an even greater deterrent effect than the threat of
seizure of goods by Customs, since the monetary penalties for vio-
lation of a cease and desist order could be higher than the value of
the goods imported.93 Moreover, an injunction can be sought from
the district court, in addition to monetary penalties. 94 Violation of
a court's injunction could lead to additional fines or imprison-
ment.93 Broader use of cease and desist orders directed to foreign
manufacturers and traders could also relieve some of the burden
on the Customs Service by transferring primary enforcement func-
tions to the Commission staff.
90. Id. at 17.
91. Id.
92. GAO Report to Selected Cong. Subcomm., International Trade:
Strengthening Trade Law Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, GAO/
NSIAD-86-150 (August 1986).
93. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2); see supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
94. Id.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) provides:
A Court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprison-
ment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near therto as to
obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command.
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In only a few cases has the ITC utilized the cease and desist
order remedy.96 It has been used principally against domestic par-
ties to stop them from selling inventories of infringing articles ob-
viously beyond the reach of an exclusion order, or to stop them
from engaging in such unfair practices as trademark infringement,
passing off, and false advertising. 7 In Food Storage Containers,"8
the orders were directed also to foreign respondents, as to their
unfair trade practices, trademark infringement, passing off and
false advertising committed in the United States. Cease and desist
orders have not yet been used by the ITC to prevent someone from
attempting to bring offending goods into the United States in the
first place.
Full utilization of the ITC's authority to issue and enforce
cease and desist orders quickly would take the Commission into
new areas of law and practice, and predictions of how the practice
would develop cannot be made with certainty.99 Cases involving
only one or a few foreign manufacturers of a product found to be
imported into the United States in violation of section 337 present
an ideal opportunity for the use of cease and desist orders directed
to the manufacturer, enjoining the manufacturer from exporting to
the United States in whatever manner has been determined to be
unfair. Depending on the facts of the case, the order could prohibit
all sales of the product destined for the United States, or it could
be tailored to permit importation if certain steps are taken by the
manufacturer. The order need not be limited to prohibiting the il-
legal practice in the precise form in which it is found to have ex-
isted in the past.100 In a case involving the Federal Trade Commis-
96. See Certain Airtight Cast-iron Stoves, 46 Fed. Reg. 7105-02 (1981) (Inv.
No. 337-TA-69, USITC Pub. No. 1126); Certain Sandwich Panel Inserts, 47 Fed.
Reg. 42,847-01 (1982) (Inv. No. 337-TA-99, USITC Pub. No. 1246); Certain Food
Storage Containers, 49 Fed. Reg. 29,287-02 (1984) (Inv. No. 337-TA-152, USITC
Pub. No. 1563); Certain Compound Action Metal Cutting Snips and Components
Thereof, 50 Fed. Reg. 31,052-01 (1985) (Inv. No. 337-TA-197, USITC Pub. No.
1831).
97. A cease and desist order directing domestic purchasers not to use im-
ported products when practicing a process in the United States that infringes a
process patent was disapproved by President Reagan on policy grounds pursuant
to Section 337(g), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g), 47 Fed. Reg. 29,919 (July 9, 1982).
98. 49 Fed. Reg. 29,287-02 (1984).
99. Other agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission have had extensive
experience with cease and desist orders; useful case digests and practice notes are
collected in 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 9661 et seq. (1982).
100. Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
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sion, the Supreme Court stated: "If the Commission is to attain
the objectives Congress envisioned, it cannot be required to confine
its road block to the narrow lane the transgressor has traveled; it
must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal,
so that its order may not be by-passed with impunity.''0 If there
are unknown manufacturers in addition to the known ones, it may
prove effective to issue cease and desist orders as to the known
manufacturers and an exclusion order directed to products ema-
nating from any source other than those named in the cease and
desist orders.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cease and desist orders are a powerful weapon available to the
complainant in section 337 cases. The finding of personal jurisdic-
tion over the respondent, which is the necessary foundation for an
order to cease and desist, is not difficult to obtain. This finding
must be requested even when an exclusion order is the principal
remedy sought. The complainant cannot change his mind and elect
to request a cease and desist order at the end of the case when he
is arguing for a specific remedy, because it-is then too late to prove
personal jurisdiction. When the flexible and unique features of a
cease and desist order are overlooked at the beginning of the case,
one of the most important remedies available at the United States
International Trade Commission is wasted. The Commission has
the power to protect United States companies from unfair import
competition in a variety of ways, but only if the companies seeking
this protection understand the full powers of the Commission, and
do not underestimate the strength of this sleeping giant.
101. Id.
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